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PROGRESS OF THE LAW.
As MARKED BY DECISIONS SELECTED FROM THE ADVANCE
REPORTS.
AGENCY.
It is a well-known rule of law that if the owner of goods
entrusts them to an agent with power to sell in his own name,
Undisclosed without disclosing the name of his principal, and
Principal, the agent sells in his own name to one who
Set-off knows nothing of any principal, but honestly be-
Against lieves that the agent is selling on his own account,
Agent the purchaser may set-off any demand he may
have on the agent against the demand for the goods made by
the principal. But this rule is only to be applied where the
purchaser has no reason to suspect the existence of an un-
known principal. Where, as in the present case, the charac-
ter of the selling was equivocal, and, as was known to the
purchaser, the agent was in the habit of acting sometimes on
his own account and sometimes for an unknown principal, it
was incumbent for the purchaser, in order to avail himself of
his right of set-off against the principal, to inquire in what
character the agent was acting in this particular transaction.
Since he neglected to take this precaution, and, as it proved,
that the agent was acting for an undisclosed principal in this
instance, the purchaser's right of set-off against the latter was
gone: Baxter et al. v. Sherman et al., 76 N. W. (Minn.) 211.
BANKS AND BANKING.
The laws of 1896 of New York exempted from taxation
"the deposits in any bank for savings which are due deposit-
Taxation, ors." In People ex rel. v. Peck, 50 N. Y. Suppl.
Exemption, 820, the question arose whether the exemption ex-
Bank, tended to surplus funds accumulated under the
Surplus Banking Law of 1892 " to meet any contingency
or loss in the business from the depreciation of its securities
or otherwise." The Supreme Court, after a review of cases
upon the subject, decided that such accumulations formed
part of the debt due depositors, and were, consequently, not
taxable.
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BILLS AND NOTES.
Action was brought May 13, 1895, to foreclose a morgage,
by reason of alleged default in the payment of interest on the
Interest, following promissory note: "August 7, 1893-
Time of Two years after date we promise to pay to the
Payment order of H. F. M. one hundred dollars . . . and
interest from date at the rate of 6 per cent. per annum; and,
if interest be not paid annually, to become as principal, and
bear the same rate of interest. . . . H. M. M. and M. A. M."
Held, (I) that in the absence of a specific promise to pay the
interest at a time different from that fixed for the payment of
the principal, the principal and interest both became due at
the same time, and (2) that the provision, "if interest be not
paid annually, etc.," did not amount to a promise to pay the
interest annually; and that, therefore, since there was no de-
fault, the action was prematurely brought: Xotsinger et lix. v.
Mliller, 53 Pac. (Kan.) 869.
A Michigan statute (How. Ann. St. § 632) makes the cer-
tificate of protest of a note by a notary prima facie evi-
Protest, dence of protest. Upon suit against an indorser
Certificate, the following certificate was offered: "United
Sufficiency States of America, State of New York, ss.: I,
Henry Wheeler, Notary Public, do hereby certify that I have
this day duly protested for non-payment the annexed bill.
H. Wheeler, Notary Public. (Seal.) Troy, December 14,
1896." Held, that the certificate was insufficient in that it
did not state the place and manner of the demand: Un. Nat.
Bank v. Wins. Milling" Co., 76 N. W. (Mich.) I.
CARRIERS.
In Indiana the rule prevails that the special liability of a
common carrier remains attached to a railroad after the arrival
of baggage at its destination until the owner has
Arrival of reasonable time and opportunity'to claim and
Goods at
Destination, remove it. If such baggage is not claimed within
Notice, a reasonable time the liability of the carrier
Liablity for becomes that of a warehouseman. No notice of
the arrival of the baggage need be given. There-
fore, when a trunk was stored for six days in the warehouse
of the railroad, which was neither fire-proof nor burglar proof,
but was of reasonably safe construction, and the owner did
not call for it until after it had been stolen (which happened
PROGRESS OF THE LAW.
CARRIERS (Continued).
on the seventh day), the railroad was not liable: I. D. & W.
R. R. v. Zilly, 5 1 N. E. (Ind.) 14 1.
The efforts of the Interstate Commerce Commission to give
effect to the remnants of the Act have received another set
Interstate back. The Western & A. R. Co. charged $1.07
Commerce per IOO lbs. for carriage from Cincinnati to
Act, Atlanta, while to Marietta, twenty miles nearer
Long and
Short Haul, than Atlanta, $1.27 was charged. The contention
Dissimilar of the plaintiff was, of course, that this discrimina-
Conditions tion was a violation of the "long and short haul "
clause, while the defendant argued that, as the 4th section of
the act prohibiting greater charges for a long than a short
haul, applied only when the transportation was under " sub-
stantially similar circumstances and conditions," such difference
in charges was proper here. In support of this, the defendant
showed that there was strong competition at Atlanta both by
rail and water, whereas, at Marietta no such rivalry existed.
Under the decision in the case of Interstate Commerce Com-
mission v. Alabama zf. R)y., 168 U. S. 144 (1897), it is settled
that the existence of competition of controlling force at one
point and its absence at another, creates such a dissimilarity
of conditions as to render section 4 inoperative. This decision,
however, said counsel for the plaintiff, still left open in each
case the question whether the dissimilarity caused by the
competition was of such extent as to make the difference in rate
complained of, reasonable, quoting Judge Severns, in finter-
state Commerce Commission v. E. T., V. & G. R. Co., 85 Fed.
107 (1898), as follows : "If dissimilarity is found, then the
further question arises whether the dissimilarity is so great as
to justify the discrimination which is complained of." The
court, however, refused to coincide with the view quoted and
held that any substantial dissimilarity in conditions rendered
the 4 th section inapplicable without further question as to
whether the discrimination was not more than commensurate,
quoting with approval the late Judge Cooley in In re L. & N.
R. Co., I Interst. Comm. Com. R. 57. " If the circumstances
and conditions of the two hauls are dissimilar, the statute is
not violated." Any such questions, under this view, must be
raised under other sections of the act: Interstate Commerce
Commission v. Western & A. R. Co., 88 Fed. 186.
The attempt of a carrier to shift liability for injuries to pas-
sengers from its own shoulders to those of independent con-
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independent tractors was frustrated in Barrow S. S. Co. v. Ka',
Contractor, 88 Fed. 197. A engaged passage on defendant's
Liability for line from Londonderry to New York from X, the
Acts of agent at Londonderry. X, on his own account,
Servants operated a steam tender to carry passengers from
the wharf at Londonderry to the steamer at the mouth of the
river. While on the tender A was assaulted by agents of X,
and he brought suit against the steamship company therefor.
The latter contended that it was not liable, since the act com-
plained of was committed by the agents of an independent
contractor. But the court considered that this case was gov-
erned by the rule which holds liable a railroad company
for acts committed by the servants of a sleeping-car company
operating on its lines.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
The clause embodied in the Federal and most state consti-
tutions, prohibiting the deprivation of a person's liberty with-
Deprivation of out due process of law, which seems to be a never-
Liberty dying source of inspiration, though its invocation
withot Due is not attended with uniform success, has again
Process, issces agn
Foreign come to the fore. A commission to take a depo-
Commission sition having been issued out of Colorado to a
notary in New York city, a subpoena was obtained directing
the relator to appear before the commissioner, and for failure
to obey to be guilty of contempt. The relator, having re-
fused to answer questions and, at the instance of the notary,
having been committed to prison, application was made for a
discharge on the ground that the prisoner was deprived of his
liberty without due process. The court, being of the opinion
that the power to commit for contempt should be jealously
guarded, and that the commissioner, even though he was also
a notary, had no such power, ordered the relator's discharge:
People ex rel. McDonald v. Leubischer (S. C. N. Y.), 51 N. Y.
Suppl. 735.
CONTRACTS.
The case of Place v. Conklin, 5 1 N. Y. Suppl. 407, is inter-
"esting as an example of the summary manner in which
Public Policy, the courts deal with transactions violating public
Illegality policy. A, a very old man, told B, his friend,
that if he could get a satisfactory housekeeper he
would marry her and give her $5oo for herself. B thereupon
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introduced C, his cousin, to A, and an engagement followed,
A agreeing to deed his house to C, in addition to $500. C,
without A's knowledge, agreed to give B for his services $50o
and a mortgage for $3500 on the house when it should be-
come hers. This she actually did after the marriage; but A,
learning of it, brought a bill to have a reconveyance of the
property made to himself, clear of any liens. The court granted
the relief prayed, but laid stress on the fact that his wife did
not object to the reconveyance, intimating that, if she had
objected, the result might be different.
CRIMINAL LAW.
The Christian Scientists have recently won a victory in the
Supreme Court of Rhode Island. A statute of that state,
Practice of General Laws 165, § 2, renders it illegal for any
Medicine, person to "practice medicine" without having
Christian obtained the proper certificates, etc. Held, that
Scientists the methods of attempted cure employed by the
Christian Scientists-such as prayer, meditation, etc.-are not
included within the term "practice of medicine:" State v.
10lod, 40 Atl. 753.
DAMAGES.
DeCamp v. Bullard, 50 N. Y. Suppl. 807 (Supreme Court).
The owner of a stream enjoined owners of land higher up
construction from floating logs down past his premises. The
of Bond, court dissolved the injunction, upon the owners of
sDamage an the logs giving a bond, with sureties, conditioned
Loss" to pay " any and all damage and loss whatsoever
.. sustained by the plaintiff" during the floating of the
logs. In a suit on the bond the plaintiff showed no damage
to his premises, but claimed that the terms of the bond
allowed him toll and the fair and reasonable value of the use
of the stream, and the court upheld that construction of the
words " any and all damage," etc.
By a vote of three judges against two, the New York
Supreme Court has decided that inadequacy is a proper
Death, ground for the trial judge setting aside a verdict
Verdict, under the following circumstances. The plaintiff's
Inadequacy intestate, who met his death through the negligence
of the defendant, had been a day laborer, in good health, earn-
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ing two dollars per diem, and charged with the support of a
wife and four children, the oldest of whom was eleven years
of age. The verdict for the plaintiff was for one thousand
dollars: Connor v. Mrayor, Etc., of New York City, 5o N. Y.
SuppI. 972.
DECEDENT'S ESTATES.
n re Fidelit, Loan, Etc., Co., 51 N. Y. Suppl. 1124. In
this case, in the Surrogate's Court, it appeared that the ex-
ecutors of an estate, which owned more than
Executor, one-half the stock and bonds of a railroad, claimed
Advantage
from Position, credit for twenty-five hundred dollars, one-half
Election to the salary of the vice-president. This item was
Office contested on the ground that that officer was one
of the executors. The facts shown were that the salary of
the executive had always been five thousand dollars; that, on
the retirement of the former president, the executors, one of
whom was a trust company, elected, by their majority of
stock, an officer of this company vice-president, and that he
was paid the salary formerly paid the president, as he dis-
charged all the duties formerly belonging to the president.
The court being of the opinion that the duties of managing a
railroad did not come within the scope of an executor's duties,
and being satisfied that the estate had not been injured by the
arrangement, decided that the "rule that the law does not
permit a trustee to assume relations inconsistent with his trust,
does not seem to have any application to these facts."
Land was sold at a judicial sale, but before the sheriff made
a deed to the purchaser, the latter died. Held, that an order
Judicial Sale, of the court confirming the sale would not be set
Death of aside, since the death of the purchaser did not
Purchaser avoid it, and his rights could be asserted by his
heirs or personal representatives: Cronkhite v. Buchanan, 53
Pac. (Kan.) 863.
EQUITY.
Standard Faslion Co. v. Siegel-Cooper Co., 50 N. Y. Suppl.
1056, held to the rule that where equity will not grant specific
Injunction, performance of a contract because it involves the
continuous doing of continuous acts, neither will it grant an
Acts injunction to prevent acts expressly stipulated
against in the contract. The case of Lumley v. Magner, i
DeG., M. & G. 604 (I852), was referred to, but classed among
the exceptions to the rule illustrated by the principal case.
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EVIDENCE.
A statute of New York makes it unlawful for an auctioneer
to knock down articles to fictitious bidders. An auctioneer
Grand Jury, being indicted under this act, it appeared that the
Presumption only evidence properly admissible before the grand
of innocence jury was that the defendant had sold some plates
to the name of" Lohring," and that later one of these plates
was delivered at defendant's house. It was held that such
evidence was not sufficient to support an indictment, since the
"presumption of innocence prevails as much in the grand jury
room as elsewhere, and the evidence before that body must be
such as to clearly overcome that presumption, before an
indictment can be properly found:" People v. Lindenborn, 52
N. Y. Suppl. ioi.
A new trial will not be granted because of after-discovered
evidence unless there are peculiar facts which show that an
Newly injustice will be committed by refusing it. Thus,
Discovered when the defendant had been convicted of murder
Evidence, and a new trial had been refused, which was
New Trial applied for on the ground of newly discovered
evidence relating to the defence (an alibi), the Supreme Court
of Idaho said: "Such evidence being in direct line with the
whole theory of the defence, proper diligence required the
defendant to produce such evidence at the trial. It was in his
power to do so. A new trial was properly denied on this
ground. A new trial should never be granted on the ground
of newly discovered evidence when such evidence is merely
cumulative, nor when the alleged newly discovered evidence was
easily within the reach of defendant and could, with reasonable
diligence, have been produced at the trial. To grant a new
trial on such grounds would not be subservient to the public
good, but would, on the other hand, encourage a careless and
loose preparation by the defendant of his defence:" State v.
Davis, 53 Pac. 678.
In a prosecution for rape there was offered in evidence a
copy of a magazine sent by the defendant to the prosecutrix.
Certain words in the magazine were marked and
Writing, dotted, so that when arranged in proper order by
Pecuijar Form arne
an expert, they formed intelligible sentences on
matters relevant to the issue. Held, that the magazine in this
form was practically a letter and was admissible : State v. Weth-
Ciell, 40 Atl. (Vt.) 728.
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HUSBAND AND WIFE.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, following the general
current of decisions, has decided that a divorce will be granted
Divorce, to a wife when it appears that her husband is
Cause, infected with syphilis, and cohabitation with him
Venereal is dangerous, and it is no excuse for him to
Disease plead that the disease was communicated to the
wife before marriage. The case falls within the statute
permitting divorce, Mar. 13, 1815, 6 Sm. L. 286, I P. & L.
Dig. 1638, "when any husband shall have by cruel and
barbarous treatment endangered his wife's life, or offered such
indignities to her person as to render her condition intolerable
and life burdensome and thereby force her to withdraw from
his house and family:" Mcllralon v. Mcalon, 40 Atl. 795.
INNKEEPERS.
The Queen's Bench Division of England has recently de-
cided that the relationship of innkeeper and guest exists
between the proprietor of a hotel and a personHotel,
Dining-Room, who comes in to take a meal in the dining-room.
Guest, In this case plaintiff made use of the hotel merely
Liability as a restaurant, without any intention of lodging
there, but the proprietor was held liable for the loss of his
overcoat which was stolen while in the dining-room, on the
ground that plaintiff was a technical "guest," and the pro-
prietor an "innkeeper:" Orchard v. Bushi [1898], 2 Q.B.
284. (See note in this issue.)
INSURANCE.
A policy of insurance against burglary contained a promise
to indemnify the assured under the. following condition: "if
Burglary, the property above described, or any part thereof,
insurance, shall be lost by theft following upon actual, forcible
-1Actual,
Forcible and and violent entry upon the premises wherein the
Violent same is herein stated to be situate, etc." The
Entry" doc& of the shop in which the insured goods
were stored was neither locked nor bolted, and a thief gained
access to the goods, which he stole, by merely turning the
handle of the door.
In a suit on the insurance policy, the English Court of
Queen's Bench Division held that the entry through the door,
above described, was an " actual, forcible and violent" entry
within the terms of the policy: It re G. & G., Etc., Ins. Co.
[1898], 2 Q. B. 136.
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In Trinder, Anderson & Co. v. 2. & .Ins. Co. [1898], 2
Q. B. 123, a ship's cargo was insured, the master of the ship
Marine being one of the insurers. The cargo having
Insurance, been lost through the negligence of the master,
Negligence of suit was brought by him, together with the other
Master,
Loss, owners, against the insurance campany.
Recovery The Court of Appeal of England held that the
mere fact that the master's negligence caused the loss would
not prevent a recovery by him on the policy. "That the
negligent navigation of a ship by a person other than the
assured affords no defence to an action upon a policy of
marine insurance against perils of the sea when the loss is
immediately occasioned by a peril of the sea is clear, the
reason, in my opinion, being that what is insured against is a
peril of the sea, which is none the less a peril of the sea,
though brought about by negligent navigation. Is there, then,
any warranty by a part owner, if he be one of the assured,
that he will not personally be guilty of negligent navigation
during a voyage covered by the policy? We are not dealing
with a loss brought about by the wilful act of the assured.
Negligent navigation has never been held equivalent to
'dolus,' or the 'misconduct' which is spoken of by Lord
Campbell in Thompson v. Hopper, 2 B. & Ad. 73 (1813)."
(Per Smith, L. J.)
Solomon v. ContinentalFire tlis. Co., 50 N. Y. Suppl. 922, af-
fords a very liberal interpretation of the clause in a policy that
Notice of in case of fire the insured should give "immediate
Loss, notice" to the insurer. In this case the policy
Excuse for was in a safe which remained in the ruins for six
Delay days, but the policy itself was not recovered for
about fifty days, having become mislaid after its removal from
the safe with other papers. As the plaintiff was merely an
assignee of the policy and ignorant of the company's name, he
was unable to give notice till the recovery of the document.
The insurance company had, in the meantimg, received actual
notice of the loss, but not through the plaintiff. The Supreme
Court affirmed the decision of the referee that " defendant
received sufficient notice of the loss of the plaintiff within the
requirements of the condition of the policy."
LANDLORD AND TENANT.
Drago v. 2J7ead, 51 N. Y. Suppl. 360 decided that in a suit
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by a lessee of a store against the lessor for failure to make
Covenant to repairs, the loss of profits incurred through lessee's
Repair, alleged inability to carry on business in con-
Damages, sequence of the lack of repair, can form no part of
LossofProfits the damages, the court saying: "Such damages,
if recoverable at all, are recoverable only where the tenant is
not only unable to carry on his business on the demised
premises, but where his eviction from the demised premises
prevents him from carrying on business at all."
In Mason v. Tietig, 52 N. Y. Suppl. 249, it appeared that a
lease had been made to a firm for a year; that the firm had
Holding Over, ended, and one of its members held over after the
Lease to Firm expiration of the year. The landlord endeavored
to hold him as a tenant for a year under the terms of the
lease to the firm, but it was held that " It is true that, when a
tenant, under a lease for a year, holds over after the expiration
of the year, he may, at the election of the landlord, be held as
a tenant for another year under the terms of the lease. But
that is not this case. The defendant was not tenant under the
original lease. That he was a member of the firm who were
the tenants has no effect whatever. As he was not the tenant
under the lease he could not be deemed to hold over under
the lease."
LIBEL.
The New York Court of Appeals, by a vote of four to three,
affirmed a verdict of $4ooo for a libel which charged bribery,
Identification etc., upon some one referred to, vaguely, as "the
of Parties London head of a large New York firm of cloth
Libelled, jobbers." To assist the jury in identifying plaintiff
Evidence as the person intended by this language, evidence
was admitted of articles published in three other newspapers,
of the same general purport, but referring to plaintiff by name.
These papers had printed the articles the morning before
election, and the defendant's alleged libel appeared in the after-
noon of the same day. The opinion of Bartlett, J., dissenting,
cites Bourke v. Warren, 2 Car. & P. 307 (1826), in which it
was said, "if witnesses, who state that they understand that
the plaintiff is the person, also say that they were enabled so
to understand by the perusal of another libel, with which the
defendant had no concern, their evidence ought to be laid out
of the case." The majority are content with referring to
Odgers, Sland. & L., p. 467; Newell, Defam., p. 767: Man
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Ingen v. Mail & E press Pub. Co., 50 N. E. 979. Martin, J.,
with whom concurred Parker, C. J., and Gray and O'Brien, J.J.
Bartlett, Haight and Vann, J.J., dissented.
NEGLIGENCE.
The Supreme Court of Indiana, in Abbitt v. Lake Erie &
W. Ry. Co., 50 N. E. 729 (Jordan, J., with Howard and
Contributory McCabe, JJ., dissenting), decides that where two
Negligence, co-employes of a railroad are so situated that it
Co-employes becomes the duty of one to look out and give
notice of approaching trains, the relation of principal and agent
is created; and if on account of negligence in the performance
of this duty, injury results by act of a third party not a fellow
servant, such negligence in legal contemplation would be the
negligence of the injured one, and justly imputable to him.
The court allows that the rule of Thorogood v. Bryan, 8 C. B.
115, has been repudiated in most jurisdictions, but asserts that
a clear case of principal and agent was made out in this instance.
The dissenting opinion of Howard, J., protests vigorously
against the assumption that "persons so engaging together at
work are mutual agents of one another." For discussions of
this subject see 17/inster v. Ry. Co., 53 Mo. App. 276 (1893);
Puterbaugh v. Reasor, 9 Ohio, 484 (1859); Griffith v. R. Co.,
44 Fed. 574 (189o); Schon v. Staten I E. R. Co., 45 N. Y.
Suppl. 124, and cases cited in 7 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law
(2d Ed.) 445.
In Watson v. P. & C. Rwy., 4o Atl. 699, the Supreme
Judicial Court of Maine decided that it is not negligence per
Electric Car, se for a passenger to ride on the platform of an
Riding on electric car, but that the question of his contribu-
Platform, tory negligence, if he is injured, is to be determined
Negligence as in any other case.
Per Se It was claimed that while the above rule was
applicable to horse cars, yet that the opposite rule, which is
enforced in the-case of steam railroads (Goodwin v. R. R., 84
Me. 203 (1891) ), should be applied to the case of electric cars.
In answer to this the court said: " An electric car is still a
street car, and, in our opinion, the conditions, especially with
respect to riding upon platforms, are more similar to those of
the horse street car than those of a railroad train upon a steam
railroad. It is a notorious fact that steet railroad companies
whose cars are propelled by electricity constantly accept and
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invite passengers to ride upon the platforms of their cars when
there is no room inside, and that persons having occasion to
use such cars are frequently glad for even a foothold upon the
platform, step or footboard. Neither carrier nor public have
regarded the street car platform as a known place of danger,
and we are not disposed to say, as a matter of law, that a
passenger who rides upon the platform of an electric car is
thereby guilty of contributory negligence . . . . Such is the
conclusion that many of the courts of this country have arrived
at: Elliott v. Rwy., I8 R. 1. 707 ([892); Pray v. Rwy., 44
Neb. 167 (1895); Wilde v. Rwy., 163 Mass. 533 (i895);
Reber v. Traction Co., 179 Pa. 339 (1897)." Per Wiswell, J.
The Supreme Court of Missouri has lately, in accordance
with the weight of authority, applied the rule of res ipsa
Evidence, loqnitur to the case of broken electric wires. In
Presumption, Garnwon v. Ladede Gaslight Co., 46 S. W. 968, it
Electric Wires was held that the mere fact that a wire, maintained
by the defendant company, broke and fell into the street, and
plaintiff's intestate, stepping on it was killed, made out a prima
facie case of negligence on the part of the company, which it
must meet by proof that the wire was down through no fault
of its servants or agents. See 37 A~i. LAW REG. N. S. 584,
where the cases on the subject are collected.
The question frequently arises as to what degree of safety a
pedestrian may assume to exist in the public highways and the
Highways, sidewalks thereof, without acting at his or her peril.
Defects The Supreme Court of New York holds that,
Therein where a sidewalk consists of a strip of flagstones
three feet wide, with a growth of high grass on each side, a
pedestrian may, to avoid an obstacle on the flags, step through
the high grass to reach the street, without being guilty of
contributory negligence in falling into a hole concealed by the
high grass: Leaverdure v. M7ayor, Etc., of N. Y Cit', 5o N. Y.
Suppl. 882.
The question involved in those cases which are now well
known under the title of the "Turntable Cases" has been
Structure recently decided by the Court of Errors and
Attractiveto Appeals of New Jersey. A turntable, belongingChildren,Inlury, to the defendant corporation and located on the
"Turntable land of the latter,was left unguarded and was used
Cases" as a play-ground by the children of the neighbor-
hood, one of whom, plaintiff, was injured while playing there.
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The court held that the defendant could not be said to have
'" allured " the children there, and was, therefore, under no
more obligation to supply a safe place for them than it would
be bound to afford protection to an adult trespasser, so it was
therefore not liable: D. L. & W. R. R. v. Reich, 40 Aft. 682.
The language of Mr. Jeremiah Smith, ez:-Justice of the
Supreme Court of New Hampshire, in an able article on the
subject, I I Harvard Law Review 449, was quoted with ap-
proval. Dixon, Ludlow and Krueger, JJ., dissented.
This question has arisen many times and a recovery has
often been allowed upon a similar state of facts: R. R. v. Stont,
17 Wall. 657 (1872); IKeffe v. R. R., 21 Minn. 207 (1875) ;
Koons v. R. R., 65 Mo. 592 (1877); R. R. v. Fitzsimmzons, 22
Kan. 686 (1879); Fergnson v. R. R., 75. Ga. 637 (1885);
Barrettv. R. R., 91 Cal. 296 (I89I); Walsk v. R. R.,67
Hun, 604 (Sup. Ct. N. Y. 1893). But in many junsdictions
the railroads have been held not liable, and the better rule
seems to have been laid down in the principal case: Frost v.
R.R., 64 N. H. 220 (1886); Daniels v. R. R., 154 Mass. 349
(i891); Walsh v. R. R., 145 N. Y. (1895), (reversing Walsh v.
R. R., 68 Hun, 604); Turess v. R. R., 4o Atl. (N. J.) 614
(1898).
PLEADING AND PRACTICE.
An action was brought in equity which was demurred to
and the demurrer sustained because of misjoinder of parties.
Amendment, The point of law was subsequently fully explained
Lossof ight in another case, which was affirmed on appeal.
Thereto Notwithstanding that it was thus shown that the
complainant had misconceived his cause of action, he filed an
amended bill in equity. which was defeated by a demurrer,
and the demurrer sustained on appeal. Again, he filed a bill in
equity which was defeated as before. At last, four years from
the time of filing the original bill, the plaintiff asked per-
mission to amend and substitute an action at law. The court,
on appeal, disposed of the motion. " Having thus, in defiance
of our judgment, twice rendered, again adhered to his original
position, surely he must now stand or fall by that position.
He does not claim to have been misled as to the facts.
After four years of successful defence to the equitable action,
the defendants should not now be called upon in the same
action to meet a host of entirely new and distinct causes of
action at law: " Higgins v. Gedney, 52 N. Y. Suppl. 33 1.
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In Jf'yte v. Builders' League of Vew York, 52 N. Y. Suppl.
65, a peculiar state of facts was presented, raising a question
in the law of easements. A, the owner of two
DivisionLine, adjoining lots, built three houses thereon, the
Right of middle one being one-half on the lot now owned
Removal,
Easements by the plaintiff and one half on the lot now owned
by defendant. A common sewer ran along the
line between the two lots; the entrance to the middle house
was on the defendant's lot and the water supply also came
through the same lot. On A's death a partition was made
and the defendant and plaintiff each became the owner of one
lot. The defendant took down all that part of the middle
house which stood on his lot, destroying the water supply and
sewer connection to the remaining half. Plaintiff brings this
bill to compel a restoration of that part of the house removed
and to recover damages.
The court admitted the existence of the rule that an owner
conveying part of his lands impliedly grants all apparent ease-
ments used and necessary for the benefit of the part granted,
such as water supply from a spring, but concluded that a
different rule applies here. " No case has been found," said
the court, "which declares the use of a building erected on
two adjoining lots to be a common servitude for both." The
division of title separated the interest into single interests " to
be disposed of at pleasure."
Defendant was the owner of two fields, across which ran a
path used by the public. Defendant and his predecessors in
Owner of title had occasionally repaired a stile on the path,
Land, but the stile fell out of repair and plaintiff, while
Public Way, crossing it, was injured. On suit against de-
Duty of fendant the Court of Queen's Bench Division held
Repair that the mere fact that defendant had repaired the
stile was no evidence of the fact that he was liable to repair it
Y'atione tenurae, since it was probable that the repairs were made
for defendant's own benefit: Rundle v. Hearle [I 898], 2 Q. B. 83.
RECEIVERS.
The power of a receiver to make contracts was fully
discussed in the N. Y. Supreme Court in it re Punnet Cycle
Powerto 1095. Co., 53 N. Y. Suppl. 204. The receiver of
Make the Shipman Engine Mfg. Co. had authority given
Contracts, him by the court to carry on the business "and
Loss of Profits make up and dispose of the goods and articles
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made by said corporation, and such goods and articles as he
can manufacture with its plant at a profit, for such period of
time as to him seems beneficial to the creditors and stock-
holders of such corporation." He entered into a contract to
supply the Punnet Cycle Co. with 2500 sets of bicycle parts,
but before it was completed the Cycle Co. failed and went into
the hands of a receiver. The receiver of the vendor thereupon
sought to recover damages for goods manufactured, but not
delivered, and also for loss of prospective profits on goods
ordered but not manufactured. The referee allowed the
former claim, but disallowed the claim for profits, and in con-
firming the report the court held that the grant of powers of
the receiver of the Shipman Co. did not authorize such a
contract; that he could not agree to deliver a specified
quantity of goods in a specified time, since a breach of such a
contract would render the estate liable to damages. " If at
any time it should become unprofitable, he was required to
cease manufacture, or he could have been required to stop.
He could not by any contract for the making and delivery of
goods in the future, subject the property in his hands to the
risks and vicissitudes of trade." It is respectfully submitted
that such an interpretation practically ties the receiver's hands
and ends the business.
RES JUDICATA.
The House of Lords of England has recently reiterated the
rule that when a question of law is decided by the House, it
cannot be departed from a subsequent hearing ofHouse of
Lords, the case, even though it may have been erroneous.
Decision, The only remedy is by Act of Parliament: London,
conclusive- Etc., Co. v. London City C'ounci/ [ 1898], A. C. 375.
hess In this case the only question argued was as to the
power of the House to reconsider previous decisions of its own,
and, if it thought the decisions wrong, to overrule and depart
from them in subsequent cases; which question was decided in
the negative. The facts of the case were not discussed. How-
ever, if the previous decision had been based on a mistake of
fact, such as the application of an Act of Parliament which had
been repealed, then the Lords would not be bound by their
former decision, but might decide the case on the correct facts.
Per Halsbury, L. C., ibid, p. 38o.
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SALES.
A, the agent of a cash-recorder company, induced B to buy
one of their machines, it being agreed between them that the
Oral machine could be returned if not satisfactory,
Representa- without payment. Thereupon A made out a
ttons, written "order," saying it contained their agree-Written
Contract, ment, and B signed without reading. As a matter
Duty to Read of fact nothing was said in the "order" about the
privilege of return without payment. On suit for the price,
defendant proved the above facts and his return of the machine.
Plaintiff contended that the vendee was under an obligation to
read the written contract before signing and was bound thereby,
but the court decided he had a right to rely on A's statement
that the writing contained their agreement: Hougl v. Cash-
Recorder Co., 51 N. Y. Suppl. I 134.
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.
An Ohio statute (Rev. Stat. § 2859) provides that, " When
any personal taxes shall stand charged against any person,
Running and the same shall not be paid within the time
AgainstState, prescribed by law, . . , . the treasurer of such a
Party in county . . . . is hereby authorized and empowered
Interest to enforce the collection by a civil action in the
name of the treasurer of such county against such person for
the recovery of such taxes." In an action brought under this
statute for unpaid taxes the statute of limitations was pleaded.
The Supreme Court of Ohio held that the general rule, that
the statute of limitations does not run against the state, was
applicable in this case, since, although the state was not a
party to the record, it was the real party in interest: Was/eney
v. Schott, 5 1 N. E. 34. In cases where the state is a mere
nominal party, the rule is different: Hartman v. IHunter, 56
Ohio, 175 (1897).
TRADE-NAME.
Plaintiff opened a store for the purpose of dealing in general
merchandise, and extensively advertised it by signs and through
,Nickle the newspapers as the "Nickle Store." An in-
Store," junction as asked for to restrain defendant from
Injunction maintaining a store of the same character directly
opposite, bearing a large sign-" Nickle Store." Held, that
the injunction would issue, since the trade-name was unique
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and not descriptive of the business carried on. But if plaintiff
had been a dealer in the metal, nickel, or had kept one of
those stores commonly known as "five cent stores," where
the majority of articles may be purchased for a " nickel," a
court of equity would not interfere: Duke v. Cleaver, 46 S. W.
(Tex.) 1128.
TRUSTS.
Property was left to the presiding bishop of the Church of
Latter-Day Saints, "to receive it in trust, to expend the
Charitable annual interest or income, according to his discre-
Trust, tion, for the benefit of the members of the Church
Beneficiaries, of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, whether it
Proper be for public schools, parks, watering cities,
acclimatizing foreign plants or anything else
whereby the members may be benefited." The devise was
attacked on the ground that it violated the rule against per-
petuities.
Held, (i) that the specific objects of the trust, viz., public
schools, etc., were of a charitable nature and formed the basis
of a charitable trust, and (2) that although the phrase, " or
anything else whereby the members may be benefited," was of
itself broad enough to include non-charitable things, yet the
court, in order to sustain the trust, would restrict its operation
to the charitable objects named above: Staines v. Burton, 53
Pac. (Utah) lol5. (See note in this issue.)
In Dunlap v. Gill, 51 N. Y. Suppl. 265, it appeared that
one Whitworth devised property as follows: " I give and de-
Gift to vise to Mary Ely, otherwise called Mother Jerome,
Religious use, all the real estate of which I am seized, . . . to
lmpliedTrust, have and hold the same to her, her heirs and
Estoppel of
Heirs of assigns forever. My purpose in making this
Trustee devise is to devote the same to the object of a
hospital under the charge of the Sisters of Charity, but in ex-
pressing this purpose I do not desire to create any trust in
law affecting said premises, willing as I am to confide unre-
servedly in the honor and conscience of said devisee."
During her life the donee always treated the property as the
property of the Sisterhood, the taxes were paid by the Order,
and finally it was exempted from taxation as the property of
a charitable institution. On the death of Mary Ely, a
claim having been made by her heirs, it was held that she had
646
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treated herself as trustee and impressed the estate with the
character of trust property, notwithstanding" the words of the
will, and that consequently the heirs were estopped by the
acts of their ancestor.
TURNPIKES.
A statute of New Jersey (P. L. 185 I, p. 177) authorizes a
turnpike company to collect toll for the passage of, intcr alia,
Bicycle, "carriages of burden or pleasure" along the pike,
Toll, and it further enacts that the rate shall be, " For
"Carriage of every carriage, sleigh, or sled drawn by one beast,
Pleasure" one cent, for every additional beast one cent."
This action was brought by the turnpike company against a
bicycle rider who refused to pay toll for riding on the pike.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey held that a bicycle
was not a " carriage of pleasure" under the statute, taking
into consideration the reference to being "drawn by beasts."
"A bicycle ridden by a human being no more comes within
this description than a wheelbarrow drawn by a man, or a
perambulator pushed by a nurse maid:" G. & S. TurnPike Co.
v. Leppee, 40 Atl. 68i. String v. C. & B. Turnpike Co., 40
Atl. (N. J. Ct. of Chan.) 774 (1898), accord.
WILLS.
In Root's Estate, 40 Atl. 818, there was a devise, "Unto imy
nephew, WVilliam Root, the legacy or sum of one thousand
Latent dollars." Evidence was offered to show that,
Ambiguity, although the testator had a nephew, William
Parol Root, yet his wife had a nephew of the same
Evidence name, and that the testator showed more affection
for the latter than for his own nephew, and had expressed the
intention of making a legacy in his favor. The Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania held that there was no latent ambiguity
and that the evidence was inadmissible.
The decision was based upon the ruling in Appel v. Byers,
95 Pa. 479 (i88i), where a devise was made "to my nephew,
P. B.," the testator having two nephews, one legitimate, the
other illegitimate. Evidence that the testator meant the
illegitimate nephew was excluded. The contrary was held in
fn re Ashlon [1892], Prob. 83, and Powell v. Biddle, 2 Dall.
70 (1790).
